









The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  contribute  to  the  analysis  of  Corporate  Social 
Responsibility  (CSR)  from  an  economic  perspective,  in  two  ways.  Firstly, 
introducing a new definition and a new framework of analysis, which can account 
for  both  the  externally­driven  and  the  internally­driven  view  of  CSR.  Secondly, 
developing  a  dynamic model  of  internally­driven  CSR  – which  draws  inspiration 
from  the  literature  on  renewable  resources  –  to  show  that,  under  certain 
circumstances,  an  enlightened  profit‐maximizing  firm  will  behave  as  ‘Socially‐


























The  issue  of Corporate  Social Responsibility  (CSR) has  gained  increasing  importance  over 
the past years. While definitions vary, there is a general consensus on the fact that CSR includes all 
“situations where the firm goes beyond compliance and engages in actions that appear to further some 
social good, beyond  the  interests of  the  firm and  that which  is required by  law”  (McWilliams,  Siegel 
and Wright, 2006). 
However,  the  idea  that  a  firm  incurs  responsibilities  towards  the  society  beyond  its  own 
interest,  is not exempt  from critique. Perhaps  the main counter‐argument  is still  the one made by 
Milton Friedman (1970), who claimed that, from an economic perspective, it would be bad to shift 
resources  from  firm’s  the  primary  objective  of  maximizing  profits.  In  fact,  from  a  neoclassical 
perspective, maximising profits implies an efficient allocation of the resources, and hence maximises 
social welfare. 
Recent  empirical  studies  reconcile  these  two  views,  showing  that  in  many  occasions  the 
companies  which  implemented  CSR  practices  to  “further  some  social  good”  (see  above),  also 
experienced a wide range of bottom‐line benefits. These  include  ‐ among many others  ‐ enhanced 
brand image and reputation, reduction of waste and introduction of more efficient environmentally‐
friendly  production  techniques,  increased work  productivity,  greater  ability  to  attract  and  retain 
employees,  reduced  costs  from  injuries  and  absenteeism,  reduced  regulatory  oversight,  increased 
support  by  the  neighbouring  communities,  improved  access  to  capital,  government  licenses  and 
global supply‐chains.1 
                                                 
1 The companies themselves are also increasingly aware of this relationship between CSR and profits. For example, the 2008 
Annual Report of ArcelorMittal (p. 27) states: “It is ArcelorMittal’s conviction that business growth, sustainable 
communities and the creation of shareholder value go hand-in-hand. Only by addressing the global issues affecting its 
business, its people and its communities, can ArcelorMittal help establish mutually beneficial stakeholder relationship, 
attract and retail top talent and maintain the license to operate […] achieve high impact Health and Safety improvements 
that protect the company’s greatest assets – our people: the Lost Time Injury Frequency Rate improved in 2008 to 2.3 
compared to 3.3. in 2007.” 
 2
In light of this, concepts such as ‘Business case for CSR’ and  ‘Strategic CSR’ are now widely 
used  in  the  management  literature,  to  identify  business  practices  which  yield  benefits  for  the 
environment and the society at large, and also private benefits for the firms (see Porter and Kramer, 
2002).  From  this  perspective,  ‘Strategic  CSR’  is  a  distinct  phenomenon  than  traditional  charity  or 
philanthropy, from which firms do not expect any return.2 
In  our  paper we  focus  exclusively  on  this  type  of  CSR,  in  order  to  eschew  the  domain  in 
which Friedman’s critique would apply, which is every ‘non‐business’ argument for CSR, as we shall 
see  later  in  the  paper.3 All  the  ethical  considerations,  which  could  arise  on  certain  aspects  of 
‘Strategic CSR’, go beyond the scope of economic analysis. 
Among  the many  arguments  which  have  been  proposed,  to  explain  why  firms  engage  in 
‘Strategic CSR’, we  introduce here a distinction between those which see CSR as  ‘externally­driven’ 
and  those  which  see  it  as  ‘internally­driven’.  According  to  the  externally­driven  view,  there  is  a 
demand  for  a  more  ethical  behaviour  by  the  firms  among  one  or  more  of  the  stakeholders  (e.g. 
consumers,  workers,  investors,  government,  etc.),  which  leads  the  firms  to  undertake  CSR  as  a 
differentiation strategy. If this is the case, the CSR practices undertaken should reflect stakeholders’ 
preferences.4 On the contrary, internally­driven CSR is a strategy undertaken by the firms to manage 
optimally  the  factors of production, with the objective of maximising  long‐term profits. Hence,  the 
practices adopted should be closely linked to the firms’ core business activities.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two presents a short review of 
the  economic  literature  on CSR,  claiming  that  so  far  only  externally­driven views have been  taken 
into consideration. Section three  introduces a new definition and a new framework of analysis  for 
CSR, which can account for both externally­driven and internally­driven views. Section four presents 
                                                 
2 In the literature it is now more and more common to refer to CSR as only the ‘Strategic’ component of CSR, while the rest 
is called philanthropy or charity in general. For example, Antonio Gaspar (2003, p.3) defines CSR as “an investment from 
which companies should expect tangible returns and positive impact on their net profits”, while “philanthropy relates to 
donations or charitable giving from which companies do not necessarily expect any direct positive impacts on their business 
activities.” 
3 Another reason for focusing on ‘Strategic CSR’, rather than philanthropy in general, is that many empirical studies showed 
that the former is also more effective from a social welfare perspective. For example, a study by UNDP (2005) showed that 
only the projects which are sufficiently driven by business profitability can be considered sustainable in the long run, while 
charitable contributions depend too heavily on available cash-flows and therefore are often only had-hoc interventions. 
4 Prof. Jean Tirole, speaking at the third annual Economica-Coase lecture at the LSE on 19th February 2009, on the subject 
“Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility”, classified as ‘Delegated Philanthropy’ all the CSR practices in which 
companies “act on behalf of their stakeholders”. This is very similar to our definition of externally-driven CSR. 
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more than what  it costs  for  the  firms to provide  it,  the  firms  invest  in  improving the environment 
until they reach the level at which marginal benefits equal marginal costs. 
However, Baron argues  that his model  can only  explain one bit  of  the CSR undertaken by 
firms – the ‘strategic’ CSR ‐ while the other ‐ the ‘true’ CSR – should go beyond this profit‐maximising 
level, reflecting the altruistic preferences of firms’ owners or shareholders. This argument presents 
one  intrinsic  problem,  which  is  that  it  does  not  distinguish  between  social  and  private  costs  vs. 
benefits from an action. In fact, “as long as there are no negative externalities, a firm should expand 
its output until  the value  to  society of  the goods and  services produced  is  at  least  as  great  as  the 
price the firm receives” (Jensen, 2001, p.303). This implies that the profit‐maximizing level of CSR is 
also  the  socially  optimum  level,  and  any  additional  unit  of  CSR beyond  this point would decrease 
overall welfare. This is also the cornerstone of Friedman’s (1970) argument, and is the main reason 
why, as mentioned in the introduction, our paper will focus only on ‘Strategic CSR’.  
One  of  the  most  influential  papers  which  analysed  ‘Strategic  CSR’  from  an  economic 
perspective  is McWilliams and Siegel  (2002),  in which  the authors analyse  the different  impact of 
CSR on firms’ interaction in the market, depending on the products’ characteristics and the types of 






2005;  Becchetti,  Federico  and  Solferino,  2005;  Manasakis,  Mitrokostas  and  Petrakis,  2007; 
Evangelios  and  Petrakis,  2007);  (iii)  as  a  labour  market  screening  strategy,  to  attract  the  most 
motivated and productive employees (Brekke and Nyborg, 2005); and,  finally, (iv) as a strategy to 
avoid increasing government regulation (Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett, 2000; Baron, 2001).5 
Despite  the numerous  theoretical  insights,  there are  some common shortcomings  in  these 
models, which derive from the fact that they view CSR as being exclusively externally­driven. First of 




The  problem  of  asymmetric  of  information  arises  because  CSR  is  a  ‘credence  good’ 
(Manasakis,  Mitrokostas  and  Petrakis,  2007),  which means  that  consumers’ willingness  to  pay  is 
determined  by  their  beliefs  over  the  ethical  attributes  of  a  product,  but  that  they  cannot  infer 
anything  about  these  attributes  simply  by  buying  it,  or  consuming  it.  As  a  consequence,  a  time‐





their  promises  more  credible  (Besley  and  Gathak,  2007);  (ii)  a  market  for  socially  responsible 
managers,  sustained  by  the  mechanism  of  reputation,  where  firms  could  hire  to  signal  their 




                                                 
5 It might not be evident why the latter belongs to an externally-driven view of CSR. However one has to consider that the 
demand for government regulations – which the firms are trying to pre-empt – often comes from the Civil Society and other 
lobby groups, which are indirectly a stakeholder of the firm. This will be clarified in the next section of the paper. 
6 This theoretical problem has a great empirical relevance: in fact, it is quite common to hear news from companies claiming 
to undertake certain CSR practices, which then proved not to be true. 
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The problem of  free  riding has been highlighted by Bagnoli  and Watts  (2003)  and Besley 
and Gathak  (2006),  in  the  context  of  CSR  as  private  provision  of  local  public  goods.  According  to 
them, CSR is subject to the same free‐riding problem as any voluntary contribution to public goods. 
In  fact,  to provide  the public good  firms have  to charge a higher price on  their products, however 
only  some  of  the  consumers, which would  benefit  from  the  public  good,  actually  pay  this  higher 
price. Therefore, these firms do not capture all the common benefits from the provision of the public 














of  relaxing  the  assumption  that  CSR has  to  be  strictly  profit‐enhancing,  and  also  of  capturing  the 
distinction  between  private  and  social  benefits  vs.  costs  of  production.  In  fact,  in  presence  of  a 
negative  externality,  the  profit‐maximising  production  level  of  the  firm’s  goods  or  services  is  too 
                                                 
7 The socially-optimal level of CSR would be given by the standard Lindahl-Samuelson rule of marginal costs equal to the 
sum of marginal benefits. For completeness, in the model by Bagnoli and Watts (2003), there are some cases in which there 
is actually overprovision of the local public good. 
8 A ‘warm-glow’ component means that consumers receive not only the direct utility from the public good, but also an 
indirect utility from having contributed to it, which comes from altruistic preferences or social status considerations. Besley 
and Gathak (2006) showed that the presence of this component among some of the consumers, can mitigate the problem of 
free riding, but not solve it completely, unless it is strong enough to compensate for the free-riding of all the others. 
9  For example, Brekke and Nyborg (2001) show that ‘motivated’ workers provide less effort than what they would 
themselves consider morally best. In the authors’ words, a worker, despite “stretching towards his conception of morally 







externalities  they  produce  is  through  a  Pigouvian Tax.  Of  course,  this  would  not  be  a  voluntary 
intervention,  but  the  same  result  can  be  achieved  if  firms  decide  to  pre‐empt  the  introduction  of 
such a tax, by voluntarily limiting the production or implementing measures to reduce the level of 
the externality (cf. the case of pollution).11 






                                                 
10 One way to achieve this result is to assume, as Kelsey and Milne (2006) do, that the firm’s shareholders are also the 
people which are directly affected by the externality. In this case, the incentive for internalising them is straightforward, but 
it does not explain why firms would still behave like that in more realistic situations in which the shareholders are not 
directly affected by the externality. 
11 The economic incentive to do so is given by the fact that any voluntary reduction of the level of production (or reduction 
of the ‘public bad’ associated with the production), which is strictly less that what the tax-regime would lead the firm to do, 
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These  two cases are  characteristic of  externally driven views of CSR, hence our externality 
framework accounts well for these. Let’s consider now how it can be applied to internally­driven CSR. 
In  order  to  do  so,  we  start  from  the  consideration  that  firms  need  several  factors  of 
production, of which not only the level is important, but also the quality. In the introductory section, 
we  have  seen  the  CSR  can  affect  the  availability  and  the  level  of  some  factors  of  production  (e.g. 






Therefore, a potential  conflict  could arise between  the needs of  firms  ‐ which want  to use 
these  factors  to  produce  ‐  and  the  ones  of  the  society  ‐ which would  like  to  see  them  grow.  This 
conflict falls nicely into our externality framework: by employing one factor – and thus reducing the 
available  stock  ‐  a  firm  imposes  a  negative  externality  on  the  society,  while  by  investing  into 
increasing its stock, it generates a positive one.  
This  is  the  starting  point  of  our  analysis  of  internally­driven CSR,  which  identifies  all  the 
situations in which the firm’s choices towards  its  factors of production are not  in conflict with the 
interests of the society, but actually aligned with them. 
To  develop  the  theoretical  model,  we  draw  inspiration  from  the  literature  on  renewable 
resources. This literature studies the optimal rate of exploitation of a scarce resource (e.g. fisheries), 
which  would  grow  over  time  if  unexploited,  but  could  be  exhausted  if  excessively  harvested 





                                                 
12 One clarification is necessary here. What the firm pays for is always for the level of a tangible factors of production (e.g. 
materials, or number of employees), but when CSR can affect the quality of this factors, then the firm can obtain from it a 
marginal product which is higher than its actual marginal cost. 
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less  evident  ‐  case  of  quality,  this  is  due  to  the  way  reputation  spreads  over  time  and  to  the 




already  employing  (e.g.  the  longer  an  employee  has  been  working  for  a  firm,  the  higher  will  be 
his/her motivations, because of  increasing  loyalty and self‐identification; similarly, or  the  longer a 
firm has settled in a community – and the more of its members found a job in the firm ‐ the greater 
will be the support from the community). 






















A firm i employs a certain factor of production  y  to produce an output  z , which then sells at 
a constant price  p  (i.e. there is perfect competition in the market of the final output). For simplicity, 
and  without  loss  of  generality,  let’s  assume  the  simplest  production  function  possible,  t tz ky= , 
where k represent the overall efficiency of the production process.  




‐  function  of  the  amount  of  the  instrumental  input  employed,  and  also  of  the  level  of  the  stock 
available:  ( ),t t ty h E x= .13 
This  formulation  is  quite  flexible  and  can  be  applied  to  all  the  factors  of  production 
mentioned in the previous section. For example, in the case of a natural resource, w can be seen as 
the unitary cost of a machinery  to extract  the resource and  E  as  the number of machineries. The 
amount of the factor of production which will actually enter in the production process is a function 










Following  Schaefer  (1957),  we  assume  the  simplest  functional  form  to  capture  how  an 
additional unit of the instrumental input  E  translates into additional units of inputs y, given by: 
                                                 
13 We maintain the notation typical of the literature on exhaustible resources, where E  is the level of the effort (to extract a 
certain resource) and h is the harvesting function. 
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  t t ty E x=   (1) 






t te pky wE dt





t t te pkE x wE dt
ρ∞ −∏ = −∫   (3) 
The profit  function  is  linear  in  the  control  variable  ‐  the  level  of  the  instrumental  input  – 
hence we have that if, at any time t,  tpkx w< , the firm would not produce at all, while if  tpkx w>  it 
would want to produce an infinite amount of the final good, and thus to employ an infinite amount of 
the factor of production. In this case however ‐ even if the firm does not take that into account – the 
fact  that  the  firm  uses  the  factor  will  reduce  the  stock  x  available  in  the  next  period.  Hence,  as 
production  goes  on,  the  firm will  obtain  less  and  less  additional  units  out  of  a  given  level  of  the 
instrumental input, and this process will continue until  pkx w= . At this point the firm will have to 
stop  to  employ  the  factor,  because  obtaining  one  additional  unit  would  yield  negative  profits 





which  states  that  that  the  marginal  revenue  of  employing  one  additional  unit  of  the  factor  of 
production  –  given  by  the  (constant)  price  p  of  the  final  good  multiplied  by  the  efficiency  of 
production parameter k ‐ has to be equal to the marginal cost of obtaining this additional unit ‐ given 
by  the  marginal  cost  of  the  instrumental  input,  divided  by  the  additional  units  of  the  factor  of 




mean a profit‐maximising  firm which  takes  into account  the  ‘dynamic  stock externalities’  from  its 
                                                 
14 The firm’s time-discount rate is often assumed to be equal to the interest rate, because a firm can always reinvest their 
profits at the interest rate. However we will see later on in the paper how we can use it to capture the relative weight which 






of production is a function of the stock,  ( )dx F x
dt
= , and that this growth‐function satisfies some key 













Proposition 1. An  enlightened  firm  –  defined  as  a  firm  which  takes  into  account  how  it 
affects the level and the quality of certain factors of production (i.e. the dynamic stock externalities) ‐ 




enlightened  firm, and the  level at which marginal revenues equals marginal costs, decreases  in the 
firm’s  time‐discount  rate  (i.e.  it  becomes  smaller,  the  more  weight  the  firm  puts  on  maximizing 
‘short‐term’ profits). In the limit, a firm with an infinite discount rate (i.e. which does not care at all 
about  future  profits),  will  employ  the  factors  of  production  until  marginal  costs  equal  marginal 
revenues, ‘as if’ it did not take into account the dynamic stock externalities.  
 
                                                 
15 In the literature on renewable resources, the most widely used function to define how a population grows over time is 
Logistic growth function, which has the following form: ( )1 xx rx F x
K
⎛ ⎞= − =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠&
, where K is referred to as the system’s 
carrying capacity, or saturation level (Clark, 1990). Despite not being used in our paper to avoid any loss of generality, the 
implications of using this particular functional form in terms of our model would be the same. The mathematical derivation 
is available upon request. 
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Proof. The Current Value Hamiltonian for this problem is: 
  ( )H pkEx wE F x Exλ= − + ⎡ − ⎤⎣ ⎦   (6) 
Deriving  the  first order conditions and cross­substituting,16 we obtain our expression  for  the optimal 
exploitation of the resource at every time: 







where  the  first derivative of  the  factor of production’s growth  function,  ( )'F x ,  is  referred  to as  the  
‘own/internal rate of return’ in the literature on renewable resources. 
The formula implies that a firm should increase the level of the instrumental input, up to the point at 
which  the  time­discount  rate  is  equal  to  the  factor  of  production’s  ‘own  rate  of  return’,  plus  an 
additional  element  which  captures  the  reduction  in  future  costs  for  obtaining  the  factor.  In  fact, 











For values of the  x  small enough,  the  ‘own rate of return’ has  to be greater  than  the  firm’s discount 
rate, ( )'F x ρ> , and in this case the firm will not employ the factor of production at all, because it will 
make higher profits by letting the stock grow and use  it in the future.17 
                                                 
16 See the Appendix for complete mathematical derivation. 
17 Note that - for the non-negativity of the profits assumption - the second term on the left-hand side of equation (7) has to be 
positive, hence the whole left hand side of the equation will be greater than ρ . For this result to be realistic, however, we 
will need to make some assumptions on the fact that (i) if the firm does not utilises the factor, someone else will not do it, 
and also that (ii) if it does not employs it today, it will be able to do so in the future. These aspects are discussed in 
Preposition 4, in the last section of the paper. 
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For  values  of  x  large  enough,  ρ  will  be  greater  than  the  right­hand  side  of  equation  (7),  since we 







.  In  this case  the  firm will  find  it 
profitable  to employ  the  instrumental  input  to obtain  the  factor of production, and will produce  the 
final good. As this process goes on, the stock of the factor will be reduced,  ( )'F x  will increase ­ because 
of  diminishing marginal  returns  –  and   








employing  one  additional  unit  of  the  factor,  pk ,  and  the  marginal  costs  of  obtaining  it,  w
x
,  will 









it  reaches  the  level  at which marginal  revenues  equal marginal  costs,  and  the  level  of  the  stock  in 
equilibrium will be higher (see Figure 2).  
From the  formula  it  is also evident that, the greater  ρ , the  further the  firm will go  in employing the 




                                                 
18 In particular, the non-negativity of the profits has to hold. In fact, the derivative of this term with respect to x , is negative 
if 2 pkx w> . Hence, the non-negativity of profit assumption is a sufficient condition to ensure that, as x  decreases, the term 








(e.g.  reforestation  programmes,  more  sustainable  production  processes  etc.),  or  its  quality  (e.g. 
flexitime, work‐life  balance,  childcare  facilities,  trainings,  etc.).  A  growth  function which  captures 
these elements could look like this: 
  ( ),dx F x S
dt
=   (8) 
where  the  level  of  CSR,  S ,  increases  the marginal  rate  of  growth of  the  factor of  production.  The 
existing  literature  on  CSR  helps  us  characterize  some  of  the  key  proprieties  of  this  function.  For 
example, the benefits of CSR are usually very high at the beginning, because the firm can address the 
‘low‐hanging  fruits’  (Husted  and  Salazar,  2006),  and  then  decrease  over  time,  until  they  reach  a 
point – which we call  MAXS  ‐  in which an additional unit of CSR does not yield any additional benefit 
for  the  resource  (McWilliams and Siegel,  2002).19 To  reflect  these  elements, we  shall  assume  that 
                                                 
19 It is important to note that these benefits are not private benefits for the firm, as for example in Baron (2001), but are 
benefits for the resource itself, in terms of increased availability and quality. Then, because in our model we have that the 
firms and the society as a whole put a value on the stock of these factors of production, both of them will benefit from the 
increased stock. Hence, we do not have the problem of distinguishing between private vs. social benefits, as it was for 
externally-driven views of CSR. 
Figure 2. ‘Enlightened’ firms and level of employment of the factors of production 








( )' , 0sF x S > ,  ( )'' , 0sF x S < ,  ( )'0lim ,sS F x S→ = ∞  and  ( )'lim , 0MAX SS S F x S→ = . Finally, the unitary – constant ‐ 
cost of CSR is τ .20 
 
Proposition  3:  An  enlightened  firm  undertakes  a  positive  level  of  CSR  –  defined  as  an 






  ( ) ( ), ,x F x S h x E= −&   (9) 
Now the control variables are two, S and E. 21 The expression for the optimal level of utilization of the 
factor of production is the following: 
  ( ) ( )2' ,,x
w F x S







  ( )' ,S wF x S pk xτ
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦   (11) 
which states that an enlightened  firm undertakes CSR until  its marginal cost, τ , equals the marginal 
benefit, which is given by the marginal effect of CSR on the rate of growth of the resource, multiplied by 




                                                 
20 It is worth highlighting that this is just the actual cost of undertaking CSR, but does not imply that CSR ‘occurs at a cost 
for the firm’ - as it was for externally-driven views of CSR. In fact, we will see CSR actually decreases the marginal cost of 
producing the final good. 






F x S→ = ∞ , ensures that, when the firm starts engaging in CSR, the right hand side 
of equation (11)  is greater  than  the  left hand side. Then, as  the  firm undertakes more CSR,  the right 
hand side decreases because of decreasing marginal returns, until it hits the level τ . This ensures that 
equation (11) will be verified, and that the firm undertakes a positive level of CSR in equilibrium. 




⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  in equation (11). Hence, for the equality to 
be  verified,  ( )' ,SF x S  will  have  to  be  higher, which  implies  that  the  equilibrium  level  of  CSR will  be 
lower. QED 
 
The  other  case  (i.e.  CSR  increases  the  overall  effectiveness  of  the  production  process) 
captures  another  common  ‘business’  argument  for  CSR,  which  is  that,  for  example,  switching  to 




  ( )y k S Ex=   (12) 
The optimal level of CSR in equilibrium is determined by the following expression: 








                                                 
22 The fact that ( )'k S  is very high at the beginning and then decreases with the level of CSR, while τ  is constant, ensures 
that the equality will be verified in equilibrium. 
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5. Conclusions and main limits of the model 
Our  model  shows  that  an  enlightened  firm  will  voluntarily  choose  to  reduce  the  level  of 
utilization of certain factors of production, with respect to the level at which marginal private costs 
equal marginal revenues. The main idea driving our result is that enlightened firms take into account 
the  ‘dynamic  stock  externalities’  from  production,  and  their  perception  of  the  marginal  cost  of 
utilizing certain factors of production will be higher than the actual marginal cost. Since we assumed 
that these factors of production are also ‘public goods’, this implies that the firms’ private marginal 
cost will  now  be  closer  to  the  one  of  the  society,  and  the  level  of  production  closer  to  the  social 
optimum  (see  Figure  1).  In  light  of  this,  enlightened  profit‐maximising  firms  will  look  ‘Socially 
Responsible’ to the eyes of the society.23 
It  is  important  to  stress  that  the  reason why  firms behave  in  such  a way,  is  not  altruistic 
motivation,  but  the  fact  that  they  realise  that  they  can  achieve  higher  profits  by  not  utilizing  the 
factors  of  production until marginal  revenues  equal marginal  costs,  but  letting  their  stock  (in  the 
sense  of  their  level  and/or  quality)  grow  and  then  utilize  a  higher  and  constant  fraction  for  an 





as  investments  which  increase  the  availability  and/or  quality  of  the  factors  of  production  in  the 




one  firm  has  access  to  the  same  factor  of  production  (i.e.  the  case  of  a  ‘common  pool’).  In  the 
literature on renewable resources, this problem is known as the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Dasgupta 
                                                 
23 Interestingly, in the management literature CSR has been also defined as “Enlightened Self-interest” (Keim, 1978), or 
“Enlightened Value-Maximization” (Jensen, 2000) 
24 “When Mars and Cadbury talk about their cocoa supplies being sustainable, they mean it. Chocolate manufacturers are 
worried about how much cocoa will be available in a decade from now” (“Why Corporate Social Responsibility is a 
Survivor”, Financial Times, 12th April 2009, p.13). 
 18






However,  before  analysing  some  of  the  possible  solutions  to  this  problem,  it  is  worth 
highlighting that only some, among the factors of production which can be affected by CSR, have the 
characteristics of a ‘common pool’ resource. Typically, these are environmental resources, water, or 
employees’  skills which  can  be  easily  transferred  from  one  firm  to  another,  etc.  On  the  contrary, 
factors  such  as  employees’  motivation,  goodwill,  ‘social  licence  to  operate’,  support  of  the 







When  it  is  not  possible  to  give  out  licenses,  under  certain  conditions  it  is  still  possible  to 
achieve the Pareto‐efficient outcome. In the context of a dynamic fishery game, Cave (1987) showed 
that,  when  players  play  a  repeated  game  and  are  allowed  to  implement  threats,  every  “credible, 
voluntary,  collective agreement”  to  limit  the exploitation  is enforceable, provided  that players are 
enough  ‘patient’.  If  we  translate  this  argument  to  the  context  of  CSR  –  assuming  that  the  time‐
discount  rate  of  enlightened  firm  is  low  enough  ‐  we  can  be  optimistic  that  the  Pareto‐efficient 
                                                 
25 This is Pareto-inefficient also for the firms’ perspective, because for enlightened firms the choice to employ the factor up 
to the level at which marginal cost equal marginal benefits is NOT the profit-maximizing strategy. 
26 It should be noted that this exclusive access would have to be for an infinite time, or at least that the firms does know 
when it is the last period. Otherwise, if the firm expects the licence to expire at time t+n, it knows that it will not have access 
to the future benefits of being enlightened, thus at t+n-1 it will find optimal to employ the factor of production up to the 





Another way  in which  the  ‘tragedy of  the common’ argument could have an  impact  in our 
model is to reduce the incentives for firms to undertake CSR. Because of the way we defined CSR, i.e. 
as  an  investment which  increases  the  availability  and/or  quality  of  certain  factors  of  production, 
then it is clear that when more than one firm has access to the same factor, some could free ride on 
the  CSR  programmes  implemented  by  others,  and  benefit  from  the  enhanced  availability  and/or 
quality of the resource without paying for it. This will reduce the private marginal benefits from CSR 
of the ‘good’ firms, leading them to reduce their provision. 





the benefits  in  terms of  increased employees’ motivation, goodwill and enhanced  ‘social  licence to 
operate’ cannot be reaped by other firms. Finally, when all of the above is not possible, or too costly 
to implement, firms should promote joint CSR programmes in certain areas, sharing the costs among 
all  the  firms  that will  benefit  from  them,  in  order  to  reduce  the  extent  of  possible  free‐riding  by 
other firms.27 
 
Finally,  another  key  question  is  what  would  happen  when  a  firm,  which  has  access  to  a 
certain factor of production today, is not sure whether it will have access to it also in the future. The 
answer  to  this question can be summarised  in one preposition, which completes  the ones derived 
previously from the theoretical model. 
 
                                                 
27 In the case of joint projects, we could expect to share the costs in proportion to the expected benefits from each projects, 
and that the final level of CSR at equilibrium will be equal to the Lindahl-Samuelson rule of marginal cost equal to the sum 
of marginal benefits for all firms. However, in reality most of the times the costs of a project are allocated taking into 
consideration the specific skills of each firms, in order to minimize total costs by maximizing contributions in kind by each 
firm, and allocating each task to the most efficient firm (see Balboni, Charles-Soverall and Levy, 2007). 
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In  fact,  from a  theoretical perspective,  the condition  for a  firm to behave as enlightened  is 
that it has an infinite future access to the relevant factor of production, or at least that it attaches a 
positive – and large enough – probability to have access to it for any period in the future.  In fact, as 






by  the  ‘common pool’  problem.  In  particular,  the  firm’s  choices will  be  affected  every  time  a  CSR 
investment does not yield benefits for the firm in general (e.g. increased reputation, goodwill, ‘social 
licence to operate’, etc.), but only on the specific factor to which the investment was directed to. (i.e. 
an  employer,  a  community,  a  government,  etc.).  Some  examples might  be  the  choice  to  train  the 






in  the  future.  For  example,  many  studies  showed  that  firms  which  are  perceived  to  be  ‘Socially 
Responsible’  are  better  able  to  attract  and  retain  the  and  most  productive  and  most  motivated 
employees (Brekke and Nyborg, 2005; Collier and Esteban, 2007). Similarly, the probability that the 
                                                 
28 If we combine the problem of future access to the ‘common pool’ one, then the condition to enforce collusion would be 
that all the firms, which currently have access to the factor of production, should have a positive probability of accessing the 
factor for every period in the future; or at least that all the firms should attach a non-zero probability to his, and all the other 
firms’ future access to the factor. Otherwise, collusion will not be sustainable and, by backward induction, firms will employ 




These empirical  regularities are  good news  for our model, because  they actually  reinforce 
the mechanisms which lead firms to behave as enlightened and undertake CSR. 
Nonetheless,  further  empirical  research  is  needed,  to  understand  under which  conditions 
firms  actually  behave  as  enlightened,  and  to which  extent  they  do  so,  depending  on  the  different 
characteristics of the relevant factors of production. 
In addition, other studies might be tailored to test some of  the specific  implications of our 
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  ( )H pkEx wE F x Exλ= − + ⎡ − ⎤⎣ ⎦   (1) 
To solve this, we set the derivative with respect to the control variable E equal to 0: 
  0H pkx w x
E
λ∂ = ⇒ − =∂   (2) 
and the derivative with respect to the state variable x equal to  ρλ λ− & , where λ&  is the derivative of the 
Lagrange multiplier with respect to time: 
  ( )'H pkE F x E
x
ρλ λ λ ρλ λ∂ ⎡ ⎤= − ⇒ + − = −⎣ ⎦∂










λ = −& &   (5) 
Plugging  equations  (4)  and  (5)  into  the  right  hand  side  of  equation  (3),  we  get  the 
fundamental expression for the optimal utilization of the factor of production: 
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  ( ) ( ), ,x F x S h x E= −&   (8) 
We have now two control variables, S and E. The Current­Value Hamiltonian for this problem is: 
  ( ),H pkEx wE S F x S Exτ λ= − − + ⎡ − ⎤⎣ ⎦   (9) 
To solve this, we set: 
  0H pkx w x
E
λ∂ = ⇒ − =∂   (10) 
  ( )'0 ,SH F x SS τ λ
∂ = ⇒ =∂   (11) 
  ( )' ,xH pkE F x S Ex ρλ λ λ ρλ λ
∂ ⎡ ⎤= − ⇒ + − = −⎣ ⎦∂
& &   (12) 
The two conditions (10) and (11) are independent, and can be solved separately, which allows 
for a closed form solution. The expression for the optimal level of utilization of the input is the following: 
  ( ) ( )2' ,,x
w F x S





By  plugging  the  value  of λ  from  equation  (10)  into  equation  (11), we  obtain  the  equation 
which determines the optimal level of CSR in equilibrium:  
  ( )' ,S wF x S pk xτ
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦   (14) 
